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Russian troops are planning to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in the spring and summer of 2025. This is stated in a new report by the US Institute for the Study of War (ISW) dated 29 March. The main purpose of such actions, according to analysts, is to achieve tactical breakthroughs to further pressure Ukraine during potential peace talks.
According to reports cited by the Associated Press, the enemy may launch a new offensive in the coming weeks. Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia regions remain likely targets, as confirmed by G7 diplomats who agree with recent warnings from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Pokrovske direction and preparations in the rear
The ISW pays particular attention to the Pokrovsk direction, where, according to Major Viktor Tregubov, a representative of the Khortytsia group of troops, Russian forces have resumed activity after an operational pause in early March. Ukrainian intelligence spotted a concentration of enemy troops near Selydove, south of Pokrovsk. Commanders on the ground also do not rule out the possibility that Russia could move forces from the Kursk region to this area.
Tactical intensification, but not a strategic breakthrough
ISW notes that despite the intensification of attacks on the Lyman – Pokrovsk – Orikhiv line, Russian troops have not achieved tactically significant success. Limited fighting has also been observed in the north of Sumy region, but without breakthroughs.
Analysts believe that the Kremlin may use local advances for information influence, especially in the context of peace talks. The seizure of territories even without strategic significance could become a political argument for demanding concessions from Ukraine, particularly in relation to lands that Russia does not officially claim.
Limited opportunities for a large-scale campaign
ISW emphasises that no massive redeployment of troops to Sumy, Kharkiv or Zaporizhzhia has been recorded, indicating limited preparations for a large-scale offensive. Moreover, Russia does not have enough operational reserves to launch three major campaigns at once.
Analysts point out that without a new, large-scale conscription, which the Kremlin is unlikely to take in the near future due to the domestic unpopularity of such a step, Moscow is unable to sustain a high-intensity multi-front offensive.
ISW’s conclusion: Russia will try to use the spring-summer escalation to create the illusion of superiority ahead of a possible negotiation phase. However, the Kremlin’s real operational capabilities are limited, and without a serious replenishment of manpower and equipment, it is unlikely to produce the result Moscow hopes for.
